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A DIFFERENT KIND OF SYMMETRY
KEVIN K. WASHBURN*
In 1959, the Supreme Court decided Williams v. Lee' and announced a federal
common law rule designed to protect tribal self-governance. Williams v. Lee sent a
powerful message about the continuing legitimacy of tribal sovereignty and tribal
governing institutions, but it is, in the first instance, a case about tribal courts. The
rule in Williams v. Lee prohibited state courts from adjudicating reservation-based
disputes when doing so would undermine the authority of tribal courts over
reservation affairs. It thus recognized the primacy of tribal courts on Indian
reservations.2 Williams v. Lee did not, of course, invent tribal courts,3 but it made the
American legal community much more conscious of their existence and established
their place in American jurisprudence.
Nearly a half-century later, tribal courts are well rooted on Indian reservations
across the country and in the American legal landscape. In light of the increasing
number-and stature--of tribal courts since the decision in Williams v. Lee and
other decisions 4 and the increasing variety of disputes in tribal courts as many tribes
enjoy greater economic development on their lands,5 tribal courts are seeing ever
more civil litigation and issuing more and more judgments. By 1992, according to
one estimate, there were 170 tribal courts exercising jurisdiction over approximately
one million Americans. 6 And for the past thirty years or so, litigants and academics
have given more and more attention to the interesting issues that arise because of the
existence of vibrant judicial systems within the courts of the Third Sovereign.7

* Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. The author expresses appreciation to Vikram
Amar, Donald Dripps, Paul Finkelman, Richard Frase, Robert Laurence, Gloria Valencia-Weber, and Elizabeth
Rodke Washburn for discussing some of the ideas set forth in the article. The author also appreciates the wisdom
that Sam Deloria has shared frequently and graciously over the years and that manifests itself often in the author's
work. The author also credits the hard work of his research assistants, Chloe Thompson and Dennis Puzz, Jr. Errors
are the author's alone.
1. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
2. Because of the newfound enlightenment toward tribal governments that the Supreme Court exhibited
in the case, Professor Charles Wilkinson cites Williams v. Lee as the case that began the "modern era" in federal
Indian law. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 1-31 (1987). Alas, the modern era has ended. See David H. Getches, Beyond Indian
Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States' Rights, Color-Blind Justice, and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L.
REV. 267 (2001).
3. Tribal courts existed at least a century earlier in substantially similar form to American courts. See, e.g.,
JOHN HOWARD PAYNE, INDIAN JUSTICE: A CHEROKEE MURDER TRIAL IN TAHLEQUAH IN 1840 (Grant Foreman ed.,
2002) (1934). Before adopting American-style courts, tribes had many other formal ways of addressing criminal
conduct and activities. See generally SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG'S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY,
TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1994); RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND
THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO COURT (1975); WILLIAM THOMAS HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND
JUDGES: EXPERIMENTS INACCULTURATION AND CONTROL (1966).
4. See, e.g., Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985) (requiring civil litigants to
exhaust tribal court processes before challenging tribal jurisdiction in federal court); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante,
480 U.S. 9 (1987) (applying the same exhaustion rule to cases arising under diversity jurisdiction).
5. See generally Nell J. Newton, A Tribal Court Praxis: A Year in the Life of Twenty Tribal Courts, 22 AM.
IND. L. REV. 285 (1998) (surveying approximately eighty-five reported cases from tribal courts).
6. See Sandra Day O'Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33 TULSA L.J. 1
(1997).
7. id. The term is borrowed from Justice O'Connor. See also Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts,
Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L REV. 225, 227 (1994) ("Law and jurisprudence in the U.S. have always
included a third sovereign, the American Indian tribes."). The author uses the term advisedly; a more appropriate
term might be "the First Sovereign."
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One question that arises more and more because of the growth of tribal courts
involves the cross-border enforcement of tribal civil judgments and orders. Between
states, the rule for cross-boundary enforcement of judgments is relatively
straightforward. Under the U.S. Constitution, each state is required to grant "Full
Faith and Credit" to "judicial Proceedings" of other states under rules prescribed by
Congress.8 Congress enacted such rules in a statute called the Full Faith and Credit
Act. 9 Pursuant to this scheme, a civil judgment obtained in one state is routinely
enforced in another state.'0 The issue of cross-border enforcement of state court
judgments in tribal courts and of tribal court judgments in state courts, however, is
not so straightforward.
State and tribal courts and legislative bodies face numerous practical issues
related to enforcement of judgments from other jurisdictions. The key policy issues
can be boiled down to one fundamental question: how much respect should a court
in one jurisdiction accord a court of another jurisdiction? In most cases, answering
this question will guide the development of an analytical framework that courts will
use in deciding whether to recognize a specific judgment."
Not surprisingly, legal scholars disagree as to how this fundamental question
should be answered. One major controversy centers on whether identical recognition
rules should apply to state, federal, and tribal courts or, alternatively, whether each
jurisdiction should make its own rules as to whether and how to recognize rulings
from other jurisdictions. 2 This debate, for reasons that will be explained in greater
detail below, 13 has been described as one of symmetry versus asymmetry between
jurisdictions.
This fundamental question for cross-border enforcement of civil judgments
between jurisdictions is compelling and even interesting. Scholars have carefully
and repeatedly addressed it.' 4 However, because academic commentary on tribal
court recognition, or full faith and credit, generally relates to orders and judgments

8. U.S. CONST art. IV, § 1. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in
which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effects thereof." Id.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000).
Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same
full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions
as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they
are taken.
Id. The Act thus omits any mention of Indian tribes.
10. See, e.g., 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 975 (2003).
11. Other important questions abound, such as whether it should matter if the other jurisdiction reciprocates.
12. See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part 1.
14. See infra notes 19, 22 (listing the works of Robert Laurence on the topic); see also Stacy L. Leeds,
Cross-Jurisdictional Recognition and Enforcement ofJudgments: A Tribal Court Perspective,76 N.D. L. REV. 313,
331-46 (2000); Karla Engle, Red Fox v. Hettich: Does South Dakota's Comity Statute Foster UnwarrantedState
Court Intrusion into Tribal Jurisdictional Authority over Civil Disputes?, 38 S.D. L. REV. 706 (1993); Daina B.
Garonzik, Full Reciprocityfor Tribal Courts from a Federal Courts Perspective: A Proposed Amendment to the
Full Faith and Credit Act, 45 EMORY L.J. 723 (1996); Panel, Recognizing and Enforcing State and Tribal Judgments: A Roundtable Discussion of Law, Policy, and Practice, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 239,239-83 (1993); William
V. Vetter, Of Tribal Courts and "Territories": Is Full Faith and Credit Required?, 23 CAL. W. L. REV. 219 (1987).
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in the civil, not criminal, arena, 5 scholars have not considered the level of respect
states and their courts accord to tribal judgments in the parallel universe of criminal
law.
In a little-noticed development that seems to be on the verge of becoming a
groundswell, state courts and legislatures have begun to accord respect, in a variety
of circumstances, to tribal judgments in criminal cases, also known as "judgments
of conviction" or, more informally, "convictions." This short article seeks to survey
how states have begun to use tribal criminal convictions, to relate these developments to the ongoing issue of recognition of civil judgments, and to search for
insights that this comparison might offer.
Part I first summarizes the ongoing academic debate between arguments for
symmetry versus asymmetry in recognition of tribal civil judgments. It then provides
a summary description of the range of approaches states have taken toward recognition of tribal civil judgments and arranges these approaches along a hypothetical
spectrum from highly respectful to disrespectful.
Part II summarizes some of the ways state courts formally recognize tribal
criminal convictions in subsequent state civil and criminal proceedings. 16 Because
of the idiosyncratic approaches that states have used toward the recognition of tribal
criminal judgments, it is difficult to draw a spectrum like the one hypothesized in
part I, but this article seeks to provide the reader a relatively clear picture of the state
of the current law.
Part Ell compares and contrasts the different approaches to recognition of tribal
civil judgments and criminal convictions, even sometimes within the same state, and
briefly explains some of the ramifications of respecting tribal criminal convictions
while denying respect for tribal civil judgments. Ultimately, part m makes a
normative argument that state courts ought to respect tribal civil judgments at least
as much as they respect tribal criminal convictions and argues further that states
already giving great respect to tribal criminal convictions ought, in turn, give similar
respect to tribal civil judgments. In summary, this article will urge a different kind
of symmetry: symmetry within each state jurisdiction in its approach toward tribal
criminal convictions and tribal civil judgments.

15. Some scholars have recognized that such questions occasionally arise in the criminal context. See, e.g.,
Melissa L. Tatum, A JurisdictionalQuandary: Challenges Facing Tribal Governments in Implementing the Full
Faith and CreditProvisionsof the Violence Against Women Acts, 90 KY. L.J. 123, 138-39, 183-84 (2002) (noting
disagreement about how to treat domestic violence protection orders that are contained in conditions of pretrial
release, probation, or parole in a criminal case, particularly in light of the fact that violation of such order may give
rise to a criminal, rather than civil, proceeding); see also Negotiating, infra note 22, at 439 (noting that there are
a variety of circumstances, including in the criminal context, in which one jurisdiction must make a decision
whether to respect another jurisdiction's proceedings, such as deciding whether to issue an order compelling a
witness to appear in another jurisdiction).
16. At the end of this work is an appendix that collects and displays the data surveyed in parts I and H; it
identifies each state and presents, side-by-side, the state's provisions as to recognition of criminal judgments and
its provisions for recognition of civil judgments.
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I. SYMMETRY, ASYMMETRY, AND RECOGNITION OF
TRIBAL CIVIL JUDGMENTS
One major controversy among academics regarding recognition of judgments
from other jurisdictions centers on whether identical recognition rules should apply
to state, federal, and tribal courts or, alternatively, whether each jurisdiction should
make its own rules as to whether and how to recognize the other jurisdiction's
rulings. Some scholars and a few courts have theorized that the Constitution's Full
Faith and Credit Clause and the federal Full Faith and Credit Act together create a
broad federal mandate of respect for tribal court judgments in state and federal
courts, and vice versa.' 7 These scholars argue that principles of full faith and credit
require each jurisdiction in the United States to take the same respectful approach
to judgments from other American jurisdictions.' 8
On the other side of this debate are those who argue that this interpretation of the
Full Faith and Credit Act is incorrect and ill conceived. Because different
jurisdictions have different needs and concerns, these scholars argue that each of the
state and tribal governments should design its own rules as to whether and how
much respect to grant another jurisdiction's judicial rulings.'9 These scholars, in
general, argue that comity, of some sort, is the appropriate approach.2 °
Professor Robert Laurence frames this argument in terms of symmetry and
asymmetry.2 ' Laurence would describe those scholars and courts who would find a
federal mandate of full faith and credit for all courts within the territorial boundaries
of the United States to be adhering to a notion of "symmetry" between courts.22 He

17. In the Full Faith and Credit Act, Congress used different language than the founders used in the
constitutional clause, broadening the language in at least one portion of the statute to include courts "within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions." 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). At least two states and one Indian tribe
have concluded from this statutory language that the Full Faith and Credit Act extends to Indian tribes. See, e.g.,
Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895, 902 (Idaho 1982) (determining that the phrase "Territories and Possessions"
includes Indian tribes); Jim v. CIT Fin. Servs. Corp., 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975) (classifying the Navajo
Nation as a "Territory"). In similar fashion, the Cheyenne River Sioux Court of Appeals has determined that the
Act requires it to recognize state judgments. See Robert Laurence, Full Faith and Credit in Tribal Courts: An Essay
on Tribal Sovereignty, Cross-Boundary Reciprocity and the Unlikely Case ofEberhard v. Eberhard, 28 N.M. L. REV.
19 (1998) [hereinafter Unlikely Case]. But see, e.g., Brown v. Babbitt Ford, 571 P.2d 689 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977)
(determining that "Territory" does not apply to Indian reservations). The primary rationale for not applying the Act
to tribes is that, when Congress has intended to mandate state recognition of tribal court actions, it has been more
explicit.
18. Robert N. Clinton et al., Dispute Resolution in Indian Country: Does Abstention Make the Heart Grow
Fonder?, 71 N.D. L. REV. 541, 554 (1995) ("I submit, and always have maintained, that tribal judgments are
judgments of the territories within the meaning of the Full Faith and Credit Act, thereby indicating that they are
entitled to the same full faith and credit as state judgments."); Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of
Conquest:A Vision Questfor a DecolonizedFederalIndian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77 (1993); Robert Clinton, Tribal
Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 841 .(1990); Fred L. Ragsdale, Jr., Problems in the
Applicationof Full Faith and Creditfor Indian Tribes, 7 N.M. L. REV. 133 (1977).
19. Robert Laurence, Symmetry and Asymmetry in Federal Indian Law, 42 ARtz. L. REV. 861 (2000)
[hereinafter Symmetry and Asymmetry]; see also Leeds, supra note 14 (noting her agreement with Laurence).
20. An early commentator once also suggested that there might be a third approach, querying, "should state
courts simply ignore tribal decisions?" See Gordon K. Wright, Recognition of Tribal Decisions in State Courts, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1397 (1985). To be fair, the author of that piece argued against such an approach.
21. See supra note 19.
22. Id. Professor Laurence has enlightened us more on these issues than any other scholar. See Robert
Laurence, The Role, IfAny, for the FederalCourts in the Cross-BoundaryEnforcement of Federal, State and Tribal
Money Judgments, 35 TULSA L.J. 1 (1999); Robert Laurence, The Off-Reservation Garnishmentof On-Reservation
Debt and Related Issues in the Cross-Boundary Enforcement of Money Judgments, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 355
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calls it symmetry because each jurisdiction must treat every other jurisdiction's
judgments exactly the same and indeed much as it treats its own, and those other
jurisdictions must do likewise. 3 Professor Laurence rejects the interpretation of the
Full Faith and CreditAct as a federal mandate addressing tribal courts.24 He argues
that "full faith and credit" does not apply because neither the Constitution nor the
applicable federal statute envisions tribal courts being part of the full faith and credit
scheme.25
Setting aside the legal question as to the congressional intent of the Full Faith and
Credit Act, Laurence rejects, as a normative manner, the policy implications of the
federal mandate interpretation. 26 He argues that the mandatory symmetry that comes
with full faith and credit is undesirable as a policy matter.27
Laurence argues that the better approach is more flexible and that each jurisdiction should adopt recognition rules appropriate to its own needs.28 In arguing that
rules for recognition of judgments ought to differ according to each jurisdiction's
needs, he thus prefers the more flexible notion that jurisdictions should adopt a
broader principle of comity rather than the restrictive mandate of full faith and
credit.29 Because his view recognizes and even encourages each jurisdiction to adopt
a different approach toward judgments from other jurisdictions,
Professor Laurence
'
characterizes his approach as one favoring "asymmetry. 30
As the academic debate has raged, tribal judges in many states seem to have
anticipated that states would reject the enforced symmetry of "full faith and credit"
but have nevertheless sought state statutes or judicial rules that would implement
respect for tribal judgments in state courts in keeping with the general theory of full
faith and credit, if not in accordance with any federal mandate to do so."' Though

(1998); Robert Laurence, The Convergence of Cross.BoundaryEnforcement Theories in American Indian Law: An
Attempt to Reconcile Full Faith and Credit, Comity and Asymmetry, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 115 (1998); Robert
Laurence, The Bothersome Needfor Asymmetry in Any Federally DictatedRule of Recognitionfor the Enforcement
of Money Judgments Across Indian Reservation Boundaries, 27 CONN. L REV. 979 (1995); Robert Laurence,
Dominant-Society Law and Tribal CourtAdjudication, 25 N.M. L REV. 1 (1995); P.S. Deloria & Robert Laurence,
Negotiating Tribal-State Full Faith and CreditAgreements: The Topology of the Negotiation and the Merits of the
Question, 28 GA. L REV. 381 (1994) [hereinafter Negotiating); Robert Laurence, The Enforcement of Judgments
Across Indian Reservation Boundaries:Full Faith and Credit, Comity, and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 OR. L.
REV.589 (1990).
23. See generally Symmetry and Asymmetry, supra note 19.
24. See supra note 19.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Symmetry manifests itself even in the less rigid context of comity with the question of whether the
state's recognition rule will require reciprocity as a condition of enforcement. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 806.245 (2003)
(requiring tribal recognition of state courts as a condition for state recognition of tribal courts). The more
fundamental question faced by states, of course, is not whether to require reciprocity, but how much respect to
accord tribal court judgments in the first instance.
29. See Symmetry and Asymmetry, supra note 19.
30. See supra notes 19, 22.
31. Several states have recently formalized rules to grant recognition to tribal judgments and orders, at least
in certain circumstances or for certain'purposes. The author testified before the Supreme Court of Minnesota on
behalf of one such initiative that culminated in a new, formal rule for the recognition of tribal court orders and
judgments. See MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 10 (adopted Dec. 12, 2003) (effective Jan. 1,2004). Other states have recently
adopted similar measures. See Arizona Rules of Procedure for the Recognition of Tribal Court Civil Judgments,
17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. (2002); see also Michael F. Cavanaugh, Michigan's Story: State and Tribal Court Try
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tribal judges may wish for state court rules more in keeping with full faith and
credit, they have tended to settle
for rules that are more flexible and thus arguably
32
more oriented toward comity.
States have adopted tremendously diverse approaches to recognition of general
civil judgments and orders from tribal courts.33 Some states are highly respectful of
tribal court civil judgments. 34 Courts in Idaho, 35 New Mexico, 36 and Oklahoma,3 7 for

example, accord tribal judgments full faith and credit, giving tribal court judgments
the same status accorded judgments from sister states. New Mexico and Idaho took
such action in court decisions. Oklahoma accorded full faith and credit through
legislative authorization and judicial rule.

to Do the Right Thing, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 709 (1999) (discussing Michigan's adoption of rule on
recognition of tribal court judgments).
32. In Minnesota, for example, the state supreme court rejected a proposed rule that would mandate
recognition of most tribal court judgments and that was, thus, consistent with the principles of full faith and credit.
Mark Cohen, Minnesota Supreme Court Rejects Enforcement Proposalfor Tribal Courts, MINN. LAW., Mar. 10,
2003, available at http://www.minnlawyer.com/SearchResult.cfm. The Minnesota Supreme Court ultimately
adopted a rule that guides judicial discretion toward several factors but does not mandate any particular result. Thus,
the final rule allows and perhaps encourages comity but leaves the decision within the discretion of state trial judges.
See MINN. R.GEN. PRAC. 10 (entitled "Tribal Court Orders and Judgments").
33. States are required by federal law to recognize the orders of tribal courts in a few narrow instances. This
work intends to focus on circumstances in which a state has a choice as to recognition of a tribal court criminal
conviction or civil judgment because it intends to comment on how states make those choices when the decision
is voluntary. Thus, the federal mandates are not particularly helpful to this discussion. Of these federal mandates,
perhaps the most well-known statute requiring the recognition of tribal court orders is the Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA), 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a) (2000), which requires state courts to grant full faith and credit for tribal court
orders for protection. Several federal statutes dealing with children either expressly or implicitly require state
recognition of tribal court orders or judgments. These include the following: Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25
U.S.C. §§ 1901, 1911 (d) (2000), which states:
The United States, every State, every territory or possession of the United States, and every
Indian tribe shall give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings
of any Indian tribe applicable to Indian child custody proceedings to the same extent that such
entities give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any other
entity.
Id.; Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (2000) (including "Indian Country" in the definition of "State"
and providing that each state "shall enforce according to its terms a child support order made consistently with this
section by a court of another State"); Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2000) (requiring
states to enforce custody and visitation determinations of other states). Although the definition of "State" provided
in the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act does not specifically include tribes, it has been held to require full faith
and credit for tribal court orders. See Leeds, supra note 14, at 333. Another federal statute mandates full faith and
credit between Maine and two Indian tribes. Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1725(g) (2000)
(stating that "[t]he Passamaquoddy Tribe, the Penobscot Nation, and the State of Maine shall give full faith and
credit to the judicial proceedings of each other").
34. For a thorough survey of how state courts have addressed these questions, see Leeds, supra note 14, at
331-46. This is a rapidly developing area. Since Professor Leeds' article was published, at least two states,
Minnesota and Arizona, have enacted new rules on recognition of tribal court judgments. See supra note 31.
35. See Leeds, supra note 14, at 332 (stating that Idaho and New Mexico are the only states to include tribes
in their definition of territory, thus giving full faith and credit recognition to tribal courts, just as they would to other
states' courts); see also Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895, 902 (Idaho 1982); Jim v. CIT Fin. Servs. Corp., 87
N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975).
36. See supra note 36.
37. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 728 (2003); OKLA. DIST. CT. R. 30(b) (2003); see Dennis W. Arrow, Oklahoma's
Tribal Courts:A Prologue,the FirstFifteen Years of the Modern Era, and a Glimpse of the Road Ahead, 19 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 7, 63-70 (1994) (describing the process through which Oklahoma's tribal recognition rule
developed); Shelly Grunsted, Full Faith and Credit: Are Oklahoma's Tribal Courts Finally Getting the Respect
They Deserve?, 36 TULSA L.J. 381 (2000).
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At the other end of the spectrum is South Dakota. The South Dakota statute on
recognition of tribal court judgments creates a strong presumption against recognition." A party seeking recognition of a tribal judgment must prove by clearand convincing evidence numerous facts related to the legitimacy of the tribal judgment.39
If these facts are proven, then the judge may recognize the tribal judgment, but only
in a narrow range of circumstances.4 °
One can imagine a hypothetical spectrum representing at one end those jurisdictions that are highly respectful toward tribal courts, such as Idaho, New Mexico, and
Oklahoma, and at the other end South Dakota, which is highly disrespectful.
Because many states have no reported court decisions, judicial rules, or legislative
determinations on recognition of tribal court judgments, their respective positions
on the spectrum cannot yet be plotted.
Some states are seemingly neutral or indifferent toward tribes. Minnesota's rule
on recognition of tribal judgments neither mandates nor prohibits recognition of
tribal judgments, nor does it set burdens of proofs or presumptions, but simply
leaves trial judges broad discretion as to whether to recognize any given judgment
and offers guidance as to appropriate factors to consider in exercising that discretion.4 1Montana apparently treats tribal court judgments as if they were foreign judgments, 42 though it is not entirely clear what this means in practice 43 because the state
legislature has not addressed tribal courts specifically and the state courts have
repeatedly avoided the issue. 4 Because of their apparent neutrality on the question,
Minnesota and Montana would likely occupy the midpoint of the spectrum until
further developments occur in those states.
Several states would lie between the midpoint of the spectrum and the Idaho-New
Mexico-Oklahoma end. Michigan, for example, presumes full faith and credit but
allows an objector to overcome that presumption. 5 Arizona, in similar fashion, is
generally respectful but stops just short of full faith and credit; it allows the person
against whom enforcement is sought to object and forbids recognition if the objector

38. S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 1-1-25 (Michie 2003); see also Red Fox v. Hettich, 494 N.W.2d 638, 647 (S.D.
1993) (holding that tribal member did not satisfy burden of proof necessary to show that tribal court had jurisdiction
so that its judgment should be recognized under principle of comity).
39. S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 1-I -25(l)(a)-(e) (Michie 2003).
40. Id. § l-l-25(2)(a)--(d).
41. MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 10 (entitled "Tribal Court Orders and Judgments").
42. See Wippert v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 654 P.2d 512, 515 (Mont. 1982).
43. See Leeds, supra note 14, at 339-40.

44. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-9-503 (2003). Section 25-9-503 states:
A copy of any foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with an act of congress or the
statutes of this state may be filed in the office of the clerk of any district court of this state. The
clerk shall treat the foreign judgment in the same manner as a judgment of a district court of this
state. A judgment so filed has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses,
and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a district court of this state
and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner.
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, Montana would recognize tribal child support orders because required by federal statute
but not tribal monetary judgments. See Anderson v. Engelke, 954 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Mont. 1998) (declining to
enforce tribal monetary judgment). But see Day v. State Dep't of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 900 P.2d 296 (Mont. 1995)
(recognizing tribal child support order).
45. MICH. CT. R. 2.615 (2003); see also Cavanaugh, supra note 31, at 712-16 (detailing the development
of the Michigan rule on recognition of tribal court judgments).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

demonstrates that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction or failed to afford due process. 46
Arizona also allows its state courts to consider several other factors in exercising
discretion as to whether to recognize the judgment over an objection.47 Some states
allow objectors to block recognition under certain circumstances, but treatment
varies as to whether the proponent of recognition or the objector carries the burden
of proof on such issues.48
Some states grant respect to civil judgments from tribal courts but limit that
respect to particular tribal courts or to tribal courts that lie within the state. North
Carolina, 49 North Dakota, 50 Wisconsin, 51 and Wyoming 5 fit within this category.
Some of these state statutes are not clear as to how state courts should treat rulings
from tribal courts outside the state. Thus, it is difficult to plot with certainty where
these states should fit on the spectrum.
In summary, many states have considered recognition of tribal civil judgments
and have reached thoughtful approaches that correspond to full faith and credit or
at least some form of comity toward tribal courts. With the exception of South
Dakota, which occupies a lonely, extreme position of disrespect for tribal courts,
most jurisdictions that have considered tribal civil judgments have decided to accord
respect and recognition in most circumstances. Some states addressed recognition
through court decisions, some through rules promulgated by courts, and some
through legislative enactment. Though the processes for reaching these rules have
differed by state, most of the rules were adopted after processes involving considerable deliberation.

46. Arizona Rules for the Recognition of Tribal Court Civil Judgments, 17B ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN., R. 1-6
(2002). Arizona also has a statute requiring recognition of involuntary commitment orders issued by tribal courts.
ARIz. REV. STAT. § 12-136 (2003) (providing that "an involuntary commitment order of an Arizona tribal court filed
with the clerk of the superior court shall be recognized and is enforceable by any court of record in this state").
47. 17B ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. R. 5(d), 529.
48. See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 2.615 (2003) (recognizing tribal court orders, etc. unless the objecting party
demonstrates one of an enumerated list of factors); N.D. R. CT. 7.2 (2003) (similarly recognizing tribal court orders
unless the objecting party can demonstrate the existence of enumerated conditions). But see, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 1-1-25 (Michie 2003) (requiring the party seeking recognition to establish an enumerated list of factors).
49. North Carolina extends full faith and credit, but only to the Cherokee Tribal Court, provided the tribe
reciprocates. N.C. GEN. STAT. § IE-I (2003).
50. N.D. R. CT. 7.2 (2003); see Ralph J. Erickstad & James Ganje, Tribal and State Courts-A New
Beginning, 71 N.D. L. REv. 569, 579-80 (1995) (describing the adoption of North Dakota rule for recognition of
tribal judgments); see also Fredericks v. Eide-Kirschmann Ford, 462 N.W.2d 164 (N.D. 1990) (holding that tribal
court judgments are enforceable in state court as a matter of comity).
51. WIS. STAT. § 806.245(6) (2003) (providing that "[a] foreign protection order.. issued by an Indian tribal
court in this state shall be accorded full faith and credit"); see also Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe
of Chippewa Indians, 665 N.W.2d 899,902 (Wis. 2003) (holding that "circuit court was required by [statute] to give
full faith and credit to the tribal court judgment").
52. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-111 (2002) (granting full faith and credit to courts of the Eastern Shoshone and
Northern Arapaho Tribes of the Wind River Reservation as long as certain conditions are met).
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H. RECOGNITION OF TRIBAL CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
Numerous tribal courts across the United States exercise some form of criminal
jurisdiction. 53 Tribal criminal jurisdiction is limited to misdemeanors 4 committed
56
by Indians. 55 Thus, it is a little more circumscribed than tribal civil jurisdiction.
In contrast to rules for recognition of civil judgments, neither any of the states nor
the federal government has taken a comprehensive, systematic, or uniform approach
toward recognition of tribal criminal convictions in subsequent state proceedings.
In contrast to the broad general rules developed carefully and deliberatively in the
civil context, state and federal courts and other decision makers that have recognized
tribal criminal convictions have done so in an ad hoc manner, recognizing them in
a variety of different contexts but not in the same general uniform terms as tribal
civil judgments.
State and federal courts use tribal convictions in one or more of the following
ways: (1) as relevant criminal history for sentencing purposes in subsequent state
criminal proceedings,57 (2) as triggers for sex offender registration requirements or
involuntary commitment of sex offenders in state civil proceedings, 58 (3) as predicates and or prior offenses for purposes of aggravated offenses or enhanced charges
in state criminal proceedings or administrative penalties in state civil proceedings,59
and (4) as a relevant component of a juvenile's criminal record for prosecution of
the juvenile as an adult. 6°
In some jurisdictions, these decisions have been made in the legislative arena.6'
In others, courts have made these decisions in interpreting statutes that are not

53. To provide but one example, the courts of the Navajo Nation heard 27,602 criminal cases during Navajo
Nation fiscal year 1998, which runs the same as the federal fiscal year, October I through September 30. See Russell
Means v. Dist. Court-Chinle Judicial Dist., 26 INDIAN L RPTR. 6083 (Navajo 1999). Driving while intoxicated and
crimes against persons (such as assault and battery) together constituted over 12,000 cases and forty-four percent
of the caseload. The next largest categories were offenses against the family, intoxicating liquor offenses, and
offenses against public order, each of which accounted for more than 2000 cases and around eight percent of the
remaining caseload.
54. Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303, tribal criminal court sentences are limited
to no more than one year of imprisonment and a fine of no more than $5000. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7), as amended
by Pub. L. 99-570, tit. IV, § 4217, 100 Stat. 3207 (Oct. 27, 1986). Because federal law classifies offenses by
reference to the maximum term of imprisonment authorized for the offense and explicitly defines a crime punishable
by one year or less of imprisonment as a misdemeanor, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (2000), then federal law would
characterize crimes over which tribal courts exercise jurisdiction as misdemeanors. Under this scheme, no tribal
offense could ever meet the federal definition of "felony." See also U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(o) (2000) ("'felony offense'
means any federal, state, or local offense punishable by death or a term of imprisonment exceeding one year,
regardless of the actual sentence imposed"). Thus, as a matter of federal law, tribal court jurisdiction is limited to
misdemeanors.
55. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
56. See Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (explaining that tribal courts generally lack civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians but noting that jurisdiction may exist over the "activities of non-members who enter
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other
arrangements" or non-member activity that "threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe").
57. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 68-82 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 92-111 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., infra note 64.
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explicit. 62 No jurisdiction has created a single broad rule that would explain how
tribal convictions may be used for all purposes within state courts. The various uses
of tribal63 court convictions by state governments can generally be grouped as
follows.

A. As Relevant CriminalHistory in Sentencing
Perhaps the broadest use of tribal convictions can be found in the state of Kansas.
By statute, Kansas has mandated that tribal convictions be used like any other state
or federal conviction in determining an offender's criminal history score for purposes of calculating a sentence under the state sentencing guidelines. 64 The Kansas
approach contrasts markedly with the approach taken by the U.S. Sentencing Commission in the federal sentencing guidelines. The Sentencing Commission chose not
to count tribal convictions routinely but to count them only in extraordinary circumstances. 65 Despite this pervasive general use of tribal convictions in sentencing,
Kansas apparently does not use tribal convictions in any specific context, such as
sex offender registration, or for driver's license revocation, or as a predicate offense
for aggravated drunk driving prosecutions. 66
Of the approximately twenty other states that utilize determinate sentencing
of which formally consider a defendant's criminal history as part
regimes, 61 many o
of the sentencing calculus, apparently no other state makes prior tribal court convictions routinely relevant. Nevertheless, some states use tribal criminal convictions for
a variety of more specific purposes both within and outside the context of criminal
justice.

62. See, e.g., infra note 114.
63. What follows is an attempt to create a few broad categories in the interest of setting forth a coherent
description of the various uses of tribal court convictions. The author recognizes that the categories are in some
respects arbitrary and might easily be drawn differently.
64. KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 21-4711 (e) (West 2002) (providing that "[o]ut-of-state convictions and

juvenile adjudications will be used in classifying the offender's criminal history" for sentencing purposes for drug
and nondrug crimes, and that "[c]onvictions or adjudications occurring within the federal system, other state
systems, the District of Columbia, foreign, tribal or military courts are considered out-of-state convictions or
adjudications") (emphasis added).
65. In the federal courts, if a federal judge wishes to credit tribal court criminal convictions, the judge must
take the extraordinary step of "departing upward" from the prescribed federal guidelines sentence. A judge may
depart upward from the guidelines sentence only after determining that the failure to count the tribal conviction
produces a criminal history score that fails to reflect adequately the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal
conduct or likelihood of recidivism. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 4A 1.2(i), 4A1.3(a). In numerous
cases, federal judges have taken this extraordinary step and accorded respect to tribal convictions. In a recent article,
the author has argued that the federal government should routinely recognize tribal criminal convictions in federal
sentencing, particularly for crimes arising in Indian Country. See Kevin Washburn, Tribal Courts and Federal
Sentencing, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 403 (2004).
66. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-262 (2002) (defining "conviction," in statute on suspension of driver's
license, as including "a conviction of a violation of any ordinance of any city or resolution of any county or a law
of another state"). Tribes are noticeably absent from this statute. See also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4902 (2002) (sex
offender registration statute triggered by convictions including "federal, military, or other state" convictions, and
omitting Indian tribes).
67. Kevin Reitz, The Disassembly and Reassembly of U.S. Sentencing Practices, in SENTENCING AND
SANCrTIONS INWESTERN COUNTRIES 222,225 (Richard Frase & Michael Tonry eds., 2001).
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B. Sex Offender Registration

Every state currently has some form of statute requiring the registration of sex
offenders.68 At least a dozen states explicitly require the registration of sex offenders
convicted in tribal courts. Arkansas,6 9 Georgia,7" Idaho,7' Iowa,72 Maine,73
Maryland,74 Massachusetts,75 Michigan,76 Nevada," Ohio,78 Oklahoma,79 and

Vermont 8° all require a sex offender convicted in a tribal court to register if he
comes to reside within the state.8 In other states, registration requirements are not
68. Congress conditioned certain federal law enforcement funding on state adoption of sex offender
registration laws. See Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration
Program, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2000) (setting forth guidelines for state programs to register sex offenders; allowing
states three years to implement programs or lose ten percent of federal funds; further providing that complying states
will receive the funds of any states that do not comply); see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2002) (describing the
federal mandate for development of sex offender registration and "Megan's Laws"); U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE,
SUMMARY OF STATE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES (2001) (surveying the sex offender registration systems of all fifty
states, including which state agency controls the registry, the number of offenders listed in each registry, whether
DNA information is included in the registry, and what form of community notification is provided by each registry).
69. ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 12-12-903(13)(A)(iii), 12-12-905 (2003).
70. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (2003) (specifying that the term "sexually violent offense" includes "a
conviction in a federal court, military court, tribal court, or court of another state or territory for any offense which
under the laws of this state would be classified as a violation of a Code section listed in this paragraph," and that
persons convicted of a sexually violent offense must register as sex offenders).
71. IDAHO CODE § 18-8303 (2003) (discussing the state registry of sexual offenders and defining "offender"
as "an individual convicted of [a sex offense under Idaho law], or a substantially similar offense under the laws of
another state or in a federal, tribal or military court or the court of another country").
72. IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2 (2003). Section 692A.2 states the following:
A person who has been convicted of a criminal offense against a minor, an aggravated offense,
sexual exploitation, an other relevant offense, or a sexually violent offense in this state or in
another state, or in a federal, military, tribal, or foreign court, or a person required to register in
another state under the state's sex offender registry, shall register as provided in this chapter.
Id.
73. Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act of 1999, ME. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, § 11203 (2003)
(including "[a] conviction for an offense or for an attempt to commit an offense of the law in another jurisdiction,
including, but not limited to, a state, federal, military or tribal court" in the definition of "sexually violent offense").
Section 11222 then requires the registration of sex offenders.
74. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROCEDURE § 11-701 (2003) (requiring persons convicted of a variety of sex
offenses, including those convicted in tribal courts, to register).
75. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, § 178C (2003) (including "any attempt to commit a [sex offense under
Massachusetts law] or a like violation of the laws of another state, the United States or a military, territorial or
Indian tribal authority" in the definition of sex offense, for which offenders may be required to register).
76. Michigan State Police Sex Offenders Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 28.722-23 (2003) (requiring
individuals convicted of sex offenses in tribal court to register).
77. NEV. REv. STAT. 179D.210 (2002) (including an offense prosecuted in tribal court as "[an offense
committed in another jurisdiction that, if committed in this state, would be [a crime against a child]").
78. 2003 OHIO LAws 45 (including violations of tribal court laws in the definition of "sexually oriented
offense" for which individuals may be required to register).
79. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, ch. 8b § 582(b) (West 2003). Section 582(b) states the following:
The provisions of the Sex Offenders Registration Act shall apply to any person who after
November 1, 1989, resides, works or attends school within the State of Oklahoma and who has
been convicted or received a suspended sentence in any court of another state, a federal court,
an Indian tribal court, or a military court for a crime or attempted crime which, if committed or
attempted in this state, would be a crime or an attempt to commit a crime.
Id.
80. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5401 (including those convicted in tribal court in the definition of "sex
offender").
81. Presumably, states lack regulatory authority to impose a sex offender registration requirement on triballyconvicted defendants who reside on Indian lands. Cf. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 453
(1996) (holding that Oklahoma lacks regulatory taxing authority over tribal members within Indian country).
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explicit as to whether tribal convictions trigger a sex offense registration requirement.82
83
Sex offender registration requirements, if not punitive, are tremendously
intrusive. A registration statute may require a sex offender to provide law enforcement authorities in any jurisdiction where he resides (or perhaps even visits for two
weeks)" 4 his name, a photograph, a list of identifying features, home address, place
of employment, date of birth, conviction information, driver's license number, information about vehicles to which he has access, and post-conviction treatment
6
history.8 5 He may be required to provide a DNA sample. He may be required to
provide an annual report on this information and, depending on the severity and
number of the underlying offense(s), he may be required to provide such updates for
a period of years or his whole life. The sex offender may be required to inform state
police authorities if he shaves a beard, borrows a car, or seeks psychiatric treatment. 7 He may be required to report promptly a change of address even if the
change occurs because of a "natural disaster."88 '
89
Sex offender registration is generally a regulatory requirement, not a penal one.
Thus, a state that recognizes a tribal criminal conviction is not, in the first instance,
using the conviction as part of a state criminal proceeding. However, because most
states make the failure to register as a sex offender a criminal offense rather than a
mere regulatory violation, 9 the tribal conviction in such a case may provide the
basis for a criminal prosecution if the offender fails to meet the extensive reporting
requirements.
Due to the jurisdictional limitations of tribal courts, a person prosecuted in a tribal
9
court can be convicted of, at worst, a gross misdemeanor. In other words, a sex
offender registration regime that considers tribal convictions may impose substantial
and onerous requirements on an Indian person who has a single tribal misdemeanor
conviction for a sex offense.

82. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-30 (Michie 2003) (South Dakota sex offender registration act,
stating that a sex offense includes "[any crime committed in a place other than this state which would constitute

a sex crime... if committed in this state").
83. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (holding that the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act did not
violate the constitutional proscription of ex post facto criminal laws because the act was civil and regulatory rather
than criminally punitive in nature).
84. ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-906(c)(l)(A)(iii)(a) (2003).
85. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). See generally Koresh A. Avrahamian, A Critical
Perspective: Do "Megan's Laws" Really Shield Children from Sex-Predators?, 19 J.Juv. L. 301, 306-07 (1998)
(discussing sex offender registration and notification statutes); Beth Miller, A Review of Sex Offender Legislation,
7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 40 (1998).
86. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §12-12-906(c)(1)(B)(i) (2003).
87. See Smith, 538 U.S. 84 (describing Alaska's Sex Offender Registration Act).
88.

ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-12-906(c)(l)(A)(vi).

89. See Smith, 538 U.S. 84.
90. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 7-2 (providing that failure to register as required is a crime of the fourth
degree). Many states modeled their sex offender registration statutes after New Jersey's. See Avrahamian, supra
note 85.
91. See supra note 54.
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C. License Revocation or as PredicateOffenses for Aggravated or Enhanced
State Charges

Several states consider tribal court convictions as prior offenses for purposes of
specific laws. Motor vehicle and domestic violence laws are two areas in which
tribal court convictions are frequently afforded recognition by state courts.
1. Motor Vehicles
Motor vehicle adjudications in tribal court are used in two different ways by state
courts. At least five states recognize tribal motor vehicle adjudications for purposes
of suspension or revocation of driver's licenses. These include Colorado,92 New
Mexico,9 3 North Dakota,94 Washington,9 5 and Wisconsin.96 In these states, a driver

licensed by the state can lose his license by virtue of a motor vehicle conviction in
a tribal court. Here, though recognition of the tribal criminal conviction is in the
context of a state civil proceeding, the outcome of the civil proceeding can
nevertheless have enormous ramifications for the person subject to the proceedings.
Losing the privilege of driving a vehicle in any of these states can dramatically
impact a person's employment opportunities, or the choice of where to live, even for
those who live in urban areas.
Another common use of tribal convictions in the motor vehicle context involves
tribal convictions for the criminal offense of driving under the influence of alcohol
(D.U.I.). Under D.U.I. statutes enacted in Michigan,97 Montana,98 New Mexico, 99
92. COLO. REv. STAT. § 42-2-127 (2003). Note that the Colorado statute counts convictions only from one
tribe's court, the Southern Ute Tribe, which is located within the State of Colorado.
93. New Mexico recently enacted N.M.S.A. 1978, § 66-5-27.1 (2003), which provides that the state may
"suspend or revoke the driver's license or driving privilege of a person who has been convicted of a motor vehicle
offense by a tribal court."
94. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-27 (2003) (authorizing the suspension or revocation of "the license of any
resident of this state or the privilege of a nonresident to drive a motor vehicle in this state upon receiving notice of
the conviction of that person in a tribal court or in another state of an offense therein which, if committed in this
state, would be grounds for the suspension or revocation of the license of an operator").
95. See Wheeler v. State Dep't of Licensing, 936 P.2d 17, 18 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (broadly interpreting
statute that did not mention tribal courts in holding that traffic convictions by a tribal court could be counted toward
the number of traffic convictions that would justify suspension of a driver's license under the habitual traffic
offender statute).
96. Wisconsin law provides for the revocation of driving privileges after certain enumerated offenses,
including convictions "under a law of a federally recognized American Indian tribe or band in this state which is
in conformity with state law." WIS. STAT. § 343.31 (2003). It also provides that convictions of a tribal court in the
state of Wisconsin shall be counted by a state court in determining the proper penalty for subsequent D.U.I.
offenses. Wis. STAT. § 343.307 (2003). See also State v. Schuman, 520 N.W.2d 107 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
97. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.625 (West 1997) (allowing the use of prior D.U.I. convictions from
other states) and § 257.65 (defining "state" as including Indian tribes); see also People v. Wemigwans, No. 239736,
2003 WL 734257, *3 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003). In allowing prior tribal court drunk driving convictions for sentencing
purposes, the Wemigwans court indicated, "Based on our review of the entire record, we conclude that nothing
occurred in the two prior tribal court proceedings that cast any serious doubt on the veracity or fairness of process
of defendant's prior convictions. Use of prior foreign convictions for enhancement purposes under these
circumstances is appropriate." Id.
98. State v. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d 1239, 1241, 1245-46 (Mont. 2003) (interpreting MONT. CODE ANN. §§
61-8-731, 61-8-734, which provide that a defendant convicted of four or more D.U.I. offenses is guilty of a felony,
explaining that tribal D.U.I. convictions count towards this number and holding that Spotted Eagle's tribal
convictions were properly considered).
99. Under N.M.S.A. 1978, § 66-8-102 (2003), subsequent convictions for driving under the influence are
penalized progressively more harshly. A fourth offense is deemed to be a felony and subjects the defendant to a
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Wisconsin, °° and Wyoming,"' a prior tribal offense can serve as a predicate for
more serious state charges or a more severe state sentence. In some contexts, the
existence of a prior conviction, including tribal convictions, can result in
02
enhancement of a state D.U.I. charge to a felony.'
0 3
The recognition of tribal D.U.I. convictions in New Mexico seems to have been
a legislative response to a high profile case in that state in which a federal Bureau
of Indian Affairs (BIA) employee with a substantial record of tribal court D.U.I.
convictions became intoxicated and drove his federal vehicle at high speed the
wrong way on a major interstate highway until he collided with another vehicle
carrying two elderly couples."04 All four people in the second car were killed and the
05
defendant, who was not seriously hurt, was prosecuted for second-degree murder.'
After extensive media attention on that case, the New Mexico legislature amended
state laws to consider tribal convictions and to make it possible for tribal driving
records to be collected within the state motor vehicle records. It is likely that the
developments in the other states were at least partially responsive to increasing
public awareness of drunk driving and increasing pressure on lawmakers and judges
to address this problem through punitive measures.
In general, these states tend to recognize the tribal criminal conviction as a matter
of course with little analysis of the nature in which the tribal conviction was
obtained.' ° 6 In other words, the court does not apply any analytical framework for
07
recognition but merely treats the tribal court judgment the same as one of its own.

mandatory minimum sentence of six months of imprisonment. Id. The statute explicitly indicates that tribal court
convictions for driving under the influence are considered prior offenses. Id.
100. Under WIS. STAT. § 343.307 (2003), a conviction of a tribal court in the state of Wisconsin for driving
under the influence shall be counted by a Wisconsin state court in determining the proper penalty for subsequent
D.U.I. offenses. See also State v. Schuman, 520 N.W.2d 107 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
101. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-5-233 (2002) (providing for enhanced sentences for subsequent D.U.I.
convictions and including tribal convictions as those that may be counted for this purpose).

102. See, e.g., supra note 99.
103. See id.
104. Joline Gutierrez Krueger, Judge to Lloyd Larson: "It's Your Fault", ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Jan. 7, 2004,
available at http://www.abqtrib.comarchives/news04/010704_newslarson.shtml (last visited Feb. 14, 2004)

(stating that Lloyd Larson, the ex-BIA employee who pled guilty to four counts of second-degree murder for the
January 25, 2002, deaths of four people, was re-sentenced to twenty years, in part as a result of his lengthy history
of D.U.I. arrests and convictions, including one arrest just two months before the fatal crash).
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. §§ 257.625, 257.65 (2003) (allowing the use of prior D.U.I. convictions from other states and simply including tribes in the definition of "state"); N.M.S.A. 1978, § 66-8-102 (2003)
(allowing the use of tribal convictions as long as the tribal ordinance or law is equivalent to New Mexico law).
107. For an alternative approach, consider, for example, United States v. Small, 333 F.3d 425 (3d Cir. 2003)
(explicitly applying the doctrine of comity in affirming use of a Japanese felony conviction as the predicate to a
federal prosecution for "felon" in possession of a firearm under 19 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) (2000)).
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2. Domestic Violence
States are required by federal law to recognize tribal domestic violence protection
orders.10 8 States have taken different approaches to meeting this federal mandate."0
Because there is a federal mandate, domestic violence protection orders are not
particularly useful in describing how states have voluntarily chosen to address tribal
criminal judgments. However, though such orders are civil in nature, they sometimes spring from tribal criminal prosecutions or as a condition of probation or
release." ° One state, Arizona, exceeds the minimum federal requirements for
recognition of tribal domestic violence protection orders by also recognizing prior
tribal court convictions in subsequent prosecutions for domestic violence."' In that
state, the existence of a prior tribal conviction within five years can enhance the
penalties that the judge may mete out for a state misdemeanor domestic violence
offense. 12
D. Transfer or Waiver of Juveniles to Adult Status
Tribal court convictions and other records have also been used widely in the
context of prosecution of juveniles as adults. In most jurisdictions, the decision to
prosecute a juvenile as an adult may be made only after considering a variety of
factors, one of which is the juvenile's prior record of criminal or delinquent

activity.' In interpreting "prior record," numerous federal courts have looked to
tribal convictions or tribal juvenile adjudications. 11"
Some state courts have followed
108. The Violence Against Women Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a) (2000), provides:
Any protection order issued that is consistent with subsection (b) of this section by the court of
one State or Indian tribe (the issuing State or Indian tribe) shall be accorded full faith and credit
by the court of another State or Indian tribe (the enforcing State or Indian tribe) and enforced as
if it were the order of the enforcing State or tribe.
109. See generally Tatum, supra note 15.
110. Cf.id. at 129, stating that
[m]ost states allow individuals to directly petition the court for a protective order, but these
orders may also be issued as part of a divorce or child custody action, any other civil proceeding,
or even as part of a criminal case [and] the court may include the protection order or keep away
provisions as part of pretrial release or bond conditions, as part of an anti-stalking case, as part
of a probation order, or even as part of parole conditions.
11. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13.3601.01(b) (2003) states that
[oln conviction of a misdemeanor domestic violence offense, if a person within a period of sixty
months has previously been convicted of a violation of a domestic violence offense or is
convicted of a misdemeanor domestic violence offense and has previously been convicted of an
act in another state, a court of the United States or a tribal court that if committed in this state
would be a domestic violence offense, the judge may order the person to be placed on supervised
probation and the person may be incarcerated as a condition of probation.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.18(5)(a) (listing the factors, including prior record, to be taken into
consideration in determining whether a waiver of juvenile jurisdiction is appropriate); MINN. STAT. § 260B. 125
subd. 4(3) (likewise listing prior record as one of the factors to be considered); see also In re Welfare of J.D.J., 2003
WL 21652325, *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (considering a juvenile's prior involvement with a tribal court, including
sanctions for disorderly conduct, intoxication, and truancy, in deciding that it was appropriate to try juvenile as
adult); In re Elmer J.K., III, 591 N.W.2d 176 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (holding waiver of juvenile status was
appropriate based in part on the juvenile's history of involvement with the tribal court).
114. Transfer of juveniles to adult status in the federal system is authorized under certain circumstances. 18
U.S.C. § 5032 (2000). Prior records, including juvenile records, are relevant to transfer. Id.; see also Bradley T.
Smith, Interpreting "PriorRecord'"
Under the FederalJuvenileDelinquencyAct, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1431, 1443-47
(2000). Numerous courts have concluded that tribal records are relevant to this inquiry. United States v. Juvenile
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suit by considering a juvenile's tribal court record as a factor in considering whether
to order transfer of ajuvenile to adult court or "waiver" of juvenile court jurisdiction
in favor of adult criminal proceedings." 5
In summary, courts have used tribal criminal convictions in a variety of ways.
IlL. INCOHERENCE IN THE RECOGNITION OF TRIBAL JUDGMENTS
AND THE ARGUMENT FOR SYMMETRY WITHIN STATES
Given the diversity of the states and their strikingly different relationships with
Indian tribes within their borders, it is perhaps not surprising that they have adopted
different approaches to recognition of tribal court judgments.
A. ComparingState Recognition of Tribal Civil Judgments with Use of Tribal
Criminal Convictions

Even the cursory survey of the way states use tribal civil and criminal judgments
set forth above yields some modest general observations. First, no state has adopted
an approach of respect for all tribal judgments without regard to whether the
Male, 336 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2003) (decision to transfer to adult status remanded on procedural grounds but tribal
record consisting of arrests for mischief, assault, disorderly conduct, and convictions for possession of firearms,
illegal possession, carrying a concealed weapon, and disobedience to the tribal court was considered by the district
court); United States v. Juvenile Male WW, 322 F.3d 482 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting district court's use of tribal
juvenile records as predicates to mandatory transfer for a crime of violence under the federal juvenile transfer
provisions and affirming, without reaching the question as to the use of the tribal juvenile records in this fashion,
the district court's alternative discretionary transfer to adult status for prosecution for second-degree murder and
assault resulting in serious bodily injury); United States v. Juvenile Male JG, 139 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting
district court's finding that tribal conviction for third-degree assault with a baseball bat was a predicate offense for
mandatory transfer to adult status for a crime of violence under federal juvenile code, but affirming on the basis of
the district court's alternative discretionary decision to transfer juvenile to adult status in prosecution for assault with
a deadly weapon for using a "12 gauge shotgun or assault rifle to shoot into the home of [the defendant's]
neighbors"); United States v. Juvenile LWO, 160 F.3d 1179 (8th Cir. 1998) (assuming that tribal court arrest and
charging records are relevant to transfer but indicating that non-adjudicated conduct may not be considered as a
prior record until adjudicated); United States v. One Juvenile Male, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D. Or. 1999) (transfer
denied in murder case, but court noted that extensive tribal criminal history militated in favor of transfer); United
States v. Anthony Y., 990 F. Supp. 1310, (D.N.M. 1998) (juvenile transferred to adult status based in part on a tribal
record of frequent fighting, drug abuse, truancy, carrying a weapon on school grounds, physically assaulting a
counselor, vandalism, and assaulting a teen with a bottle); United States v. Jerry Paul C., 929 F. Supp. 1406 (D.N.M.
1996) (juvenile transferred to adult status due in part to a tribal record consisting of a curfew violation, possession
of alcohol, a firearm violation, intoxication, and assault and battery); In re T.W. & R.T., 652 F. Supp. 1440 (E.D.
Wis. 1987) (juvenile transferred to adult status in light of tribal records including a violation of a drug ordinance
by possessing marijuana at school, a police report alleging that juvenile stripped a bicycle, a citation for truancy,
a court referral alleging that juvenile assaulted his mother's boyfriend, a citation for driving without a license, and
a citation for violation of curfew); United States v. Means, 575 F. Supp. 1068 (D.S.D. 1983) (juvenile transferred
to adult status partially on the basis of prior tribal juvenile record indicating offenses of escalating seriousness);
United States v. E.K., 471 F. Supp. 924 (D. Or. 1979) (transfer denied in case involving a juvenile charged with
burglary, theft, and assault with a deadly weapon, but the court indicated that it was obliged by federal statute as
requiring consideration of the juvenile's lengthy tribal court adjudication record); cf. United States v. Leon D.M.,
953 F. Supp. 346 (D.N.M. 1996) (denial of transfer to adult status based in part on the fact that the tribal record of
malicious mischief, a minor drug violation, and disorderly conduct was not serious); United States v. B.N.S., 557
F. Supp. 351 (D. Wyo. 1983) (denial of transfer to adult status for juvenile in murder case based in part on a fact
that tribal record, consisting of a curfew violation and possession of alcohol, was minimal).
115. See, e.g., In re Welfare of J.D.J., 2003 WL 21652325, *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (considering ajuvenile's
prior involvement with a tribal court, including sanctions for disorderly conduct, intoxication, and truancy, in
deciding that it was appropriate to try juvenile as adult); In re Elmer J.K., I1, 591 N.W.2d 176 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding waiver of juvenile status was appropriate based in part on the juvenile's history of involvement with the
tribal court).
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judgment is civil or criminal. In other words, no state has yet adopted a fully
symmetrical approach to tribal civil and criminal judgments.
Second, states have been far more idiosyncratic in their recognition of tribal convictions than in their recognition of tribal civil judgments. In the context of tribal
civil judgments, each of the states that has considered recognition of tribal civil
judgments has adopted a single uniform rule that applies to recognition of all civil
judgments and orders." 6 In contrast, in considering tribal criminal judgments, states
have not taken any such holistic or comprehensive approach. A state may recognize
tribal convictions for some purposes but not others. It appears that little deliberation
has been invested at the state level as to the broader questions of recognition of
tribal convictions. As a result, it is impossible to find a coherent pattern in the way
tribal criminal convictions are recognized in individual state jurisdictions in the
United States. It is thus difficult to summarize the various approaches except to say
that some states recognize tribal convictions for some purposes.
Third, because of the idiosyncratic and ad hoc nature in which states have chosen
to use tribal convictions, it is much more difficult to evaluate state court respect for
tribal courts in the criminal context. In the civil context, state approaches to recognition of tribal judgments can be plotted on a spectrum from highly respectful to
relatively ambivalent to not respectful at all." 7 State use of tribal criminal convictions is simply not reducible to a one-dimensional quantum of respect. On the
other hand, state court recognition of tribal convictions often occurs in a context that
is devoid of the application of any formal analytical framework for recognition, such
as rules of comity or full faith and credit. In some cases, the courts seem to treat
tribal courtjudgments in the same manner as the state's own.118 This must generally

indicate either an utter failure to consider the matter, or a great respect for the tribal
conviction. In context, it seems to reflect the former rather than the latter.
Fourth, state court recognition of tribal criminal convictions has developed in a
far different manner than state rules for recognition of civil judgments. In the civil
context, tribal court judges have worked hard nationwide to gain recognition for
their civil judgments in state courts." 9 State rules for recognition of tribal civil
judgments seem to have developed, in many instances, through careful and often
lengthy legislative or judicial rule-making initiatives. 120 In contrast, state rules for
recognition of tribal criminal convictions have developed in a far more organic
fashion and apparently have not been the subject of focused attention by tribal court
judges.
Rules for recognition of tribal convictions seem to have developed in three
different ways. Some of the rules likely developed as legislative responses to

116. Many states have particular provisions addressing the federal mandates for recognition of tribal court
orders in VAWA or ICWA. For examples of VAWA provisions, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3602 (2003); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-12.1 (Michie 2003); N.M.S.A. 1978, § 40-13-6 (1999)). For examples of ICWA provisions,
see MINN. STAT. § 260.771, subd. 4 (2003); N.M.S.A. 1978, § 32A-6-21 (2003).
117. See supra notes 33-52 and accompanying text (plotting a hypothetical spectrum).
118. See, e.g., supra note 115 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 37, 45, 50.
120. See generally supra notes 31-32 (discussing the enactment of state rules, particularly in Minnesota,
where the process stretched over several years).
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For example, recognispecific problems that received widespread media attention. I2"
tion of tribal D.U.I. convictions likely came about in some states through this
method. 22 Other state laws recognizing tribal criminal convictions, such as the sex
offender registration statutes, likely came from widespread adoption of model
legislation. 2 3 As noted above, states were under pressure to adopt sex offender
registration statutes quickly to avoid federal sanctions. 24 Finally, in some cases,
recognition of tribal court convictions or other tribal records, such as juvenile
adjudications, occurred in individual cases in which the court simply failed to
deliberate carefully as to the issue 125 and other cases in which the court did
deliberate carefully. 26 In sum, rules for recognition of tribal criminal convictions
and orchestrated fashion than
have come about in an ad hoc and far less organized
27
judgments.
civil
tribal
of
recognition
for
rules
Fifth, just as it is difficult to find coherence across the country as to the
recognition of tribal convictions, it is exceedingly difficult to detect coherence
within states as to recognition of such convictions. Why might a state such as
Kansas be willing to use a tribal conviction for purposes of determining a
defendant's criminal history in sentencing, but not as a predicate sentence for an
aggravated drunk driving charge? 28 Why would a state be willing to credit a tribal
sex offense conviction for purposes of imposing a registration requirement on the
convicted defendant, but not credit a tribal drunk driving conviction in proceedings
to suspend a state driver's license? 29 These inconsistencies are difficult to explain.
Likely, they do not reflect any particular legislative design, but expose the lack of
any careful or comprehensive deliberation within states as to the proper uses of
tribal criminal convictions.
All of these observations suggest that few policy makers or judges have focused
any attention on recognition of tribal convictions. The result is incoherence as to
recognition of tribal criminal convictions within individual states and across the
country.

121. It is not uncommon for criminal laws and other laws dealing with public safety to develop in a reactive
manner. Kenneth W Simons, The Relevance of Community' Values to Just Deserts: Criminal Law, Punishment
Rationales and Democracy, 28 HOFSTRA L. REv. 635, 645-46 (2000) (noting that "legislators are often willing to
vindicate even the unreflective, highly emotional reactions of citizens who are familiar with criminal law issues only
as the mass media sensationally reports them").
122. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing the enactment of a New Mexico D.U.I. statute
as a reaction to the fatal crash caused by a former BIA employee with a lengthy record of prior convictions for the

same offense).
123. It is otherwise difficult to understand why states such as Georgia, Ohio, and Vermont, all of which lack
any federally recognized Indian tribes currently within their borders, would grant recognition to convictions in tribal
courts.

124. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 139-143.
126.

See, e.g., supra note 97.

127. It is not uncommon for states to adopt different rules in the criminal context as "states have varied greatly
in their individual experiences of crime and their governmental responses to it." Kevin Reitz, The Disassembly and
Reassembly of U.S. Sentencing Practices,in SENTENCING ANDSANCTIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 222-23 (Richard

Frase & Michael Tonry eds., 2001). States have adopted tremendously diverse approaches to criminal justice and
sentencing. Id.
128. See supra notes 64, 66.
129. Id.
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B. ContrastingState Recognition of Tribal Civil Judgments with Use of Tribal
Criminal Convictions
In general, state courts and legislatures seem to have thought a great deal more
about recognition of tribal civil judgments than tribal convictions. In their careful
thinking about recognition of civil judgments, state courts have rarely linked civil
recognition issues with criminal recognition issues. 30 One might argue that there are
some distinctions between recognition of tribal civil judgments and use of tribal
convictions and that these distinctions might justify a difference in treatment. One
might argue first that criminal convictions and civil judgments are used for dramatically different purposes and second that they are subject to different legal regimes
that justify different treatment. Each of these arguments is addressed below.
One reason courts may not generally think to draw the linkage between civil and
criminal recognition is that use of tribal convictions arises in a different context than
enforcement of tribal civil judgments. Indeed, use of tribal civil judgments poses a
different immediate question than recognition of criminal convictions. The question
at the heart of civil recognition analysis generally involves whether a state court
should directly enforce a tribal court judgment or order that, in the prototypical case,
involves enforcement of a judgment for money damages."'
In contrast, state court recognition of a tribal criminal conviction generally
involves collateral or subsequent use of the tribal court conviction in a different proceeding. In the context of subsequent state criminal proceedings, recognition of
tribal criminal convictions is thus once removed from direct recognition for enforcement purposes. Since the prior tribal conviction is likely to be just one of the background facts in a state criminal case involving a whole new offense related to an
entirely different incident than the tribal conviction, the use of a tribal conviction in
such circumstances is different in kind than directly enforcing a civil tribal
judgment. Indeed, in contrast to the civil judgment context in which the tribal judgment occupies center stage, the matter of the tribal conviction may be something of
a sideshow, or just a niggling detail, in a state criminal proceeding for a new offense.
Though this difference is genuine, and it is always appropriate to be cautious
when comparing apples to oranges, it is difficult to see any compelling implications
of the difference. Despite the fact that the use of the tribal criminal conviction is less
direct and might be characterized as a collateral use, a tribal criminal conviction may
nevertheless have profound effects on the defendant in the same way that
enforcement of the judgment will have an effect on the civil litigant. First, use of a
prior tribal conviction might result in a dramatically increased charge, such as a
felony D.U.I. prosecution predicated on prior tribal D.U.I. convictions. Moreover,
in some cases, jeopardy in state proceedings may be a direct result of the tribal
130. The Montana Supreme Court has noted the linkage. As noted in supra note 98, Montana has a statute
that allows use of prior tribal convictions as predicates to enhance a subsequent state D.U.I. prosecution from a
misdemeanor to a felony. In one case, a defendant challenged the validity of the tribal conviction under Montana
and federal law on the basis that he lacked counsel for the tribal conviction. See State v. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d
1239, 1241, 1245 (Mont. 2003). Because Montana accords comity to tribal civil judgments, the Montana Supreme
Court upheld use of the tribal convictions even though they were issued against a defendant who was not
represented by counsel. In employing Montana's rule of comity in the context of interpreting a state statute
authorizing recognition of tribal court convictions, the court exhibited some awareness that the issues are related.
131. See Negotiating, supra note 22, at 375.
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conviction. Consider for example the sex offender registration statutes or the statutes
allowing revocation of a driver's license based on tribal traffic adjudications. In all
of these circumstances, state recognition of the tribal conviction is likely to have
severe ramifications on the person against whom the conviction is being used. In
some instances, the defendant would not be subject to criminal jeopardy but for the
prior tribal conviction.
The second possible argument that might be made to justify treating tribal civil
judgments differently than tribal criminal convictions is legal in nature. It might
proceed as follows: because the Indian Civil Rights Act 132 gives a tribal criminal
defendant a federal right to habeas corpus, state courts can be assured that tribal
courts in criminal proceedings followed procedures in accordance with that Act."'
If not, the defendant presumably would bring an action in federal court under the
habeas provisions in the federal law to challenge the tribal conviction. Moreover,
because the Act mirrors, to a great degree, the same federal bill of rights protections
that states must provide criminal defendants, states can be substantially assured that
the tribal criminal proceedings conform to procedures that state courts would
recognize as being fair. Although the Act requires that tribal civil proceedings also
meet the due process requirements set forth in the Indian Civil Rights Act, there is
no opportunity for habeas relief or other review in federal court. 134 Thus, one might
argue that tribal criminal convictions are subject to a federal guarantee that is
lacking in civil cases.
However, this argument is not very convincing for several reasons. First, none of
the cases that have addressed the use of criminal convictions or civil judgments have
noted this distinction and few of them have reflected any serious deliberation on the
question. Thus, it would appear unlikely that this has been the theoretical or
practical pretext for a distinction. Second, even the most respectful rules for
recognition of tribal civil judgments-those that can be characterized as granting
full faith and credit--offer a safety valve that allows a state court to avoid recognition. Typically, courts that grant full faith and credit will give the party against
whom the judgment is being enforced an opportunity to demonstrate that the tribal
court lacked jurisdiction 35 or that the judgment being enforced is reflective of a
policy that the forum state does not share. 136 Many such rules also offer the objector
the opportunity to demonstrate additional facts that would call into question recognition of the particular judgment, such as a lack of due process,'37 a lack of personal
or subject-matter jurisdiction, a taint of fraud or duress, or a result contrary to state
public policy. 38 In light of these commonplace safeguards inherent in rules for

132.
133.
134.
135.

25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2000).
Negotiating, supra note 22.
See id. at 427-28; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895, 902 (Idaho 1982).

136. Jim v. C.I.T. Fin. Servs. Corp., 533 P.2d 751 (N.M. 1975).

137. Given the Supreme Court's expansive notion that the due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates most of the federal Bill of Rights, see, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND

RECONSTRUCTION (1998), state courts would presumably have little difficulty concluding that a failure to meet one
of the provisions of the Indian Civil Rights Act was a violation of due process.
138. See, for example, N.D. R. CT. 7.2(b) (2003), which states,
If recognition of a judgment is objected to by a party, the recognizing court must be satisfied,
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recognition of tribal civil judgments, it can hardly be argued that erroneous or
untrustworthy tribal civil judgments will be enforced. Indeed, review of a judgment
prior to recognition creates safeguards analogous to the right to federal habeas relief
in the criminal context. In sum, the argument that there is a substantive legal
justification based in the Indian Civil Rights Act for treating tribal criminal
convictions with greater respect than tribal civil judgments simply is not convincing.
The different considerations relevant to recognition of civil judgments versus
criminal convictions are not compelling enough to justify the different treatment.
C. Troubling Asymmetry
In some cases, states that exhibit great anguish about whether to adopt respectful
approaches toward tribal courts in the civil context seemingly have been willing to
recognize tribal criminal convictions without much analysis or any of the handwringing involved in their recognition of civil judgments. For example, from the fall
of 2002 until December 2003, the Minnesota Supreme Court was publicly wrestling
with the notion of how much respect, if any, to give to civil judgments from tribal
courts. While that debate was playing out, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota
decided a case entitled In the Matter of the Welfare of J.D.J., decided in July of
2003. One of the issues in the case was how much consideration should be given to
"tribal court sanctions for disorderly conduct and for juvenile intoxication" in
reviewing a juvenile's "prior record of delinquency"
for determining whether a
139
juvenile should be prosecuted as an adult.
Without any trace of irony and with none of the anguish exhibited by the
Supreme Court in addressing how much respect to accord tribal civil judgments, the
court of appeals brushed aside defense counsel's argument that there was no
admissible "prior record of delinquency"' 40 and was willing to allow consideration
of these tribal adjudications.141 As a result, based on no particular standard as to use
of tribal adjudications and consideration of this record along with other statutory
factors, the court of appeals
upheld the juvenile's treatment as an adult and
42
prosecution for murder. 1

upon application and proof by the objecting party... that the following conditions are present: (1)
The tribal court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction; (2) The order or judgment was
obtained without fraud, duress, or coercion; (3) The order or judgment was obtained through a
process that afforded fair notice and a fair hearing; (4) The order or judgment does not
contravene the public policy of the state of North Dakota; and (5) The order or judgment is final
under the laws and procedures of the rendering court.
See also WASH. SUP. CT. CIVIL RULES, C.R. 82.5 (2003) (providing that, in the State of Washington, tribal court
orders will be recognized and enforced unless there was a lack of jurisdiction, due process, or reciprocity).
139. See Matter of the Welfare of J.D.J., 2003 WL 21652325, *2-*3 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
140. Id.at *3.
141. Id.

142. Id. at *5.
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A Wisconsin court took a similar approach a few years earlier. 43 Despite a welldeveloped rule for recognition of civil judgments, the Court of Appeals of
Wisconsin simply gave tribal juvenile adjudications the same weight as any other
adjudication in "waiving" juvenile court jurisdiction and hailing the youthful
offender into criminal court as an adult. It failed to invoke the recognition rule or
otherwise give serious consideration to whether it should recognize the tribal
records.
In short, there is a glaring inconsistency in the care with which some state courts
treat tribal criminal convictions and tribal civil judgments. Some state courts seem
willing to embrace tribal criminal convictions reflexively but remain highly
mistrustful and cautious toward tribal civil judgments.'" In other words, state courts
have sometimes treated tribal convictions with great respect and tribal civil
judgments with far less respect. This might be characterized as an asymmetric
approach to respect for tribal courts.
The phenomenon in which a state court agonizes over whether to grant respect
to a tribal judgment and then reflexively recognizes a tribal conviction is surprising
because, in theory, one might expect any asymmetry to run in the other direction.
The American legal system is predicated on the notion that adjudicating a person to
be guilty of a criminal offense is of much greater moment than adjudicating a civil
right to money damages. Indeed, federal and state constitutional provisions on
criminal justice, and particularly the Federal Bill of Rights, are structured around the
notion that courts and judicial processes must be far more careful in adjudicating
criminal cases than civil ones. To put it differently, in the United States, property
interests are deemed to be not as important as the paramount interest in liberty.' 4 1 It
thus seems ironic that state courts would exercise great caution in formulating and
applying rules for recognition for tribal civil judgments and yet recognize tribal
criminal convictions reflexively and without any substantive deliberation.
The asymmetric approach often has severe ramifications for the Indians against
whom the tribal convictions are used. In one of the juvenile cases discussed above,
a thirteen-year-old Indian child was held to answer as an adult for murder. 146 The
dramatic difference in the care taken by the court in accepting the tribal court
criminal record in that case is striking in light 1of
the extensive procedures necessary
47
for the recognition of a tribal civil judgment.

143. In re Elmer K., 591 N.W.2d at 181, n.8 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). The Wisconsin decision is less troubling
because Wisconsin law seems more respectful of tribal sovereignty. See WIS. STAT. § 806.245 (2003); see also
Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 665 N.W. 2d 899,902 (Wis. 2003) (holding
that the "circuit court was required by [statute] to give full faith and credit to the tribal court judgment"). Still, one
would expect to see a court go through the motions of considering how much respect to give to the tribal conviction
or juvenile adjudication.
144. See, e.g., supra Part I.C.
145. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krszynski, Jr., FundmentalPropertyRights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555,555-56 (1997) (noting
that the protection of fundamental liberty rights by the Supreme Court has not been fully expanded to the protection
of property rights but arguing that it should be).
146. Matter of the Welfare of J.D.J., 2003 WL 21652325 at *2-*3 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003); see supra note 139
and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., supra notes 31-32 (discussing the enactment of state rules, particularly in Minnesota, where
the process stretched over several years); see alsosupra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (describing the difficult
process for getting a tribal court judgment recognized in the state of South Dakota).
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Another example of the startling outcome is the tribal sex offender. The sex
offender who leaves an Indian reservation with a tribal misdemeanor conviction for
a sex offense and moves to a state that recognizes tribal criminal convictions may
trigger automatic registration requirements in certain states without regard to any
specific consideration of the details of the conviction. 4 8 As a result, without any
affirmative action by any state court, the offender may be subject to a self-executing
requirement that he report if he grows a new beard (or shaves off an old one) or
borrows a friend's car when he leaves his own car for repair with an auto
'
mechanic. 49
Imagine the hurdles the same person used in these example above might be
required to overcome if, as a civil litigant, he sought to have a valid tribal judgment
enforced in state court in the same state in which he is registered as a sex offender
if that state has not adopted any provision for the recognition of tribal civil
judgments. Indeed, most of the states that require sex offender registration for those
convicted of tribal sex offenses lack rules for recognition of tribal civil judgments.
It remains subject to speculation whether those states would adopt rules for
recognition of civil tribal judgments that are symmetrical to the provision in their
sex offender registration statutes.
In summary, this asymmetrical approach seems biased in favor of greater care
being used for the recognition of civil judgments than criminal convictions. One can
make a compelling argument that this kind of asymmetry is troubling. For reasons
explained more below, asymmetry in the opposite direction (in which the
jurisdiction is highly respectful of tribal civil judgments but does not use tribal
convictions for broad purposes) is far less troubling.
D. An Argument for Symmetry
Numerous states have not yet explicitly decided whether or how they will
recognize tribal civil judgments. Those states that have opted to recognize tribal
convictions for any purpose, however, have already evinced a respectful position
toward tribal courts. If state courts trust tribal courts enough to justify heightened
jeopardy for Indian defendants through recognition of tribal convictions, those state
courts ought to trust tribal courts just as much when they render civil judgments.
States that have not decided these issues should strive toward internal coherence or
symmetry. Symmetry is not simply an aesthetic concern; it is preferable for the
following reasons.
First, in deciding to recognize tribal criminal convictions for any of the purposes
discussed above, a state court has placed substantial faith in tribal courts. It has said,
in effect, that it trusts the tribal courts' judgment on a matter of the highest
importance within the American judicial system. If the same state court refuses to
recognize civil judgments in the same manner, the court exposes itself to serious
criticism of its motives. Indeed, the asymmetric model that seems to prevail in some
states creates troubling implications, at least where state courts automatically
recognize tribal convictions and deny or give only grudging respect to tribal civil

148. See supra Part II.B (discussing sex offender registration statutes).
149. Id.
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judgments. Since tribal courts possess criminal jurisdiction over Indians only,
recognition of tribal criminal convictions for any of the purposes outlined above will
always place Indians in greater jeopardy than they would face absent such a rule and
it will only harm Indians.15
In contrast, tribal courts sometimes possess civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over
non-Indians. Thus, denial of recognition of a tribal civil judgment will sometimes
have the effect of denying an Indian the ability to satisfy a judgment against a nonIndian in state court. 5 ' In short, the asymmetric model in which the state recognizes
tribal convictions but denies recognition to tribal civil judgments would result in a
system that always jeopardizes Indians on the criminal side and yet obstructs
potential benefits to Indians on the civil side. Asymmetry of this type has a disparate
and unjustifiable impact on Indian litigants. Such an asymmetric approach may
expose a state to a charge of institutional or systemic racism. It could fairly be
characterized, intentionally or not, as an approach carefully designed with one goal
in mind: to always "screw the Indians."' 52
Such a charge would be difficult to refute. Given the enormous consequences for
Indian convicts of using tribal criminal convictions in the various contexts set forth
above, such asymmetry seems perverse. If a state court is willing to trust a tribal
court when it exercises the weighty responsibility of adjudicating a criminal
conviction, courts in the same state ought to trust a tribal court when that court
lawfully adjudicates a civil dispute, which involves, by definition, a comparatively
less weighty matter.
A public choice theorist might be able to craft a cynical argument as to why some
states are willing to create rules that respect tribal criminal convictions and thus
increase jeopardy for Indian criminal defendants and yet decline to adopt
symmetrical rules of respect for tribal civil judgments. Indians vote at a lesser rate
than non-Indians' 5 3 and Indian criminal defendants likely vote even less. It may be
that convicted Indian defendants lack the political influence to prevent state
recognition of criminal convictions, but non-Indian interests are powerful enough
to block enactment of rules favoring recognition of civil judgments by state courts
or legislatures.
Another explanation of this outcome might be theorized from the scholarship of
critical race theorist Derrick Bell. Professor Bell has expressed the view that
members of minority groups will receive favorable treatment only when their
interests align with the interests of the majority.'54 Viewing tribal courts as the

150. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (noting that tribes have no jurisdiction

over non-Indians).
151. See Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
152. This quotation is a censored version of the reaction one constitutional scholar gave when such a regime
was explained to him.
153. See, e.g., Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native Americans:
Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV. BLACKLETrER

L.J., Spring 1999, at 107, 146-47 (noting that Indians are much less likely to participate in federal elections than
they are to participate in tribal elections and that in 1992 the percentage of Indians participating in federal elections
was about twenty percent, but this percentage has been increasing somewhat in the past ten years or so).
154. Derrick Bell, The Racism Is Permanent Thesis: Courageous Revelation or Unconscious Denial ofRacial

Genocide, 22 CAP. U. L. REv. 571, 575 (1993) ("[African-Americans are] disadvantaged unless whites perceive that
nondiscriminatory treatment for us will be a benefit to them."); see also Derrick Bell, Racial Libel as American
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relevant minority group under such a theory, the notion is that certain states are
willing to credit tribal court convictions because it serves the public safety interests
of the non-Indian majority.' 55 In contrast, the recognition of tribal civil judgments
serves no such interest and, thus, under Professor Bell's theory, the non-Indian
majority is less willing to respect such judgments.156
Given the troubling implications of an asymmetric state regime that provides easy
recognition to tribal convictions and yet forces tribal civil judgments to run a
gauntlet, it is difficult to justify such a regime. The obvious conclusion is that
symmetry within state systems is preferable to asymmetry.
To provide a concrete example, a state such as Kansas, which has accorded the
broadest recognition to tribal convictions in its sentencing regime 157 should be
careful not to erect substantial barriers to recognition of tribal civil judgments.
Doing so would expose it to just this sort of criticism. On the other hand, some
states demonstrate remarkable symmetry between recognition of civil judgments and
certain uses of criminal judgments. For example, Oklahoma's rule on full faith and
credit for Indian tribes is one of the most respectful in the country toward tribal civil
judgments.' 58 The only obstacle to full recognition of tribal court judgments is the
requirement that the tribe grant reciprocal status to state court judgments. 59 In that
respect, Oklahoma's sex offender registration statute, which contains strict reporting
requirements, nevertheless cannot be criticized as asymmetrical. Likewise,
Michigan's treatment of tribal convictions and civil judgments is also fairly symmetrical." 6 Michigan courts grant near-full faith and credit to tribal civil judgments 6' and recognize tribal criminal convictions for purposes of enhancement of
drunk driving laws 62 and sex offender registration.'63
Asymmetry is not always troubling. Take, for example, New Mexico. In granting
full faith and credit, New Mexico is perhaps the most respectful jurisdiction toward
tribal courts on the civil side. It has, however, only lately come to respect tribal
convictions and only in the narrow context of driver's licenses and drunk driving
laws. In that respect, New Mexico law is asymmetric in how it distributes its respect
for tribal courts, but the asymmetry is not in a direction that is particularly troubling.

Ritual, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 11-12 (1996) ("The law recognizes the rights of black people only when such

recognition serves some economic or political interests of greater importance to whites."). Professor Bell has come
to refer to this theory as interest-convergence; see DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 49-58 (2004).
155. Moreover, crediting tribal convictions provides respect to tribal courts, but doing so comes at the expense
of Indian defendants who will suffer greater jeopardy.
156. The author is grateful to Professor Gloria Valencia-Weber for recommending consideration of Professor
Bell's work in this context.
157. KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 21-471 !(e) (West 2002).
158. See Grunsted, supra note 37.
159. See OKLA. DIST. CT. R. 30(b) (2003).
160. Michigan's sex offender registration requirement arises automatically. In contrast, a tribal civil judgment
must withstand any objecting party's allegation that it was obtained by fraud or was the result of a tribal court
procedure that did not afford due process. Thus, Michigan's rule would be more symmetrical if it adopted an
approach to tribal civil judgments that was more in keeping with full faith and credit.
161. See supra note 45.
162. See supra note 97.
163. See supra note 76.
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Given the type of respect for tribal civil judgments in states such as Michigan,
New Mexico, and Oklahoma, it would not be at all troubling for these states to grant
more general respect to tribal convictions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Some scholars look forward to the time when there will be a virtually seamless
American judicial system composed of complementary and functionally integrated
tribal, state, and federal courts. Others worry that integrating the tribal courts into
the American system will impose significant costs on tribal courts, forcing them to
adopt an unnecessary uniformity and ultimately will result in "a North America
rather less Indian than today's."' 64 This article advocates neither extreme but
encourages deliberation and, ultimately, some sense of consistency within each state
as to its treatment of tribal court rulings, particularly in those states that have
expressed respect for tribal convictions.
As of this writing, at least twenty states recognize tribal criminal convictions for
one purpose or another. 165 In stark contrast to the hand wringing and anguish that
has accompanied many states' decisions about how to recognize tribal civil
judgments, decisions by state courts and legislatures to recognize tribal criminal
convictions have too often involved little careful deliberation. Such asymmetry is
troubling. While states need not recognize tribal convictions, any state that is willing
to recognize tribal convictions reflexively and without consideration will have a
difficult time justifying different treatment for tribal civil judgments.
The purpose of this essay is not to argue that states should not recognize tribal
criminal convictions. Indeed, quite the contrary. Despite the serious ramifications
of recognition of tribal criminal convictions, it is entirely appropriate for states to
respect the criminal convictions of tribal courts. Tribal courts are required by federal
law to provide substantially the same procedural protections to defendants in tribal
courts as states provide to defendants in state courts. 166 In practice, tribal courts are
not fundamentally different than state courts in adjudicating misdemeanor criminal
cases. Indeed, most tribal judicial systems are structured very much like the state and
federal court systems, and state and federal law heavily influence tribal court
procedures. 67 As one scholar who has studied the issue intently has noted, some
tribal courts "operate as nearly exact replicas of state courts." 168 In short, tribal
courts have earned the respect of state courts and legislatures. In deciding to respect
tribal convictions, state decision-makers presumably are demonstrating that respect.
State civil and criminal law with regard to respect for tribal courts should be
symmetrical. A state that is willing to respect a tribal court enough to use its
criminal convictions to place a convicted tribal defendant in greater jeopardy in a
later state proceeding ought to be willing to respect the civil judgments by the same

164. Unlikely Case, supra note 17, at 56-57.
165. See supra Part H1(discussing the use of tribal criminal convictions by states).
166. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (2000).
167. See Tom Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 31 ARIz. L. REV. 225, 227 (1989); cf.
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211-12 (1978) (noting that "some Indian tribal court systems
have become increasingly sophisticated and resemble in many respects their state counterparts").
168. Newton, supra note 5, at 311.
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tribal court. In other words, state court respect for tribal court judgments should not
stop at the boundary line between civil and criminal law.
As one scholar has recently demonstrated, even when states adopt respectful rules
for recognition of tribal court judgments, there is no guarantee that state courts will
recognize even those tribal court orders that are required by federal law to be
recognized. 69 Trust is a two-way street. As Indian tribes become more economically
successful, enforcement of state judgments on Indian reservations will become an
ever more important issue to state citizens. Though occasional failures will
inevitably occur in both state and tribal courts, creating a system of laws that
eliminates unjustifiable systemic biases will go a long way toward preserving the
integrity of state and tribal courts and maintaining trust among sovereigns. State
courts should endeavor to adopt rules that accord with the notion of symmetry
outlined above.

169. For an interesting analysis of this issue, see Leeds, supra note 14, at 346-60 (noting that state courts
sometimes refuse to recognize tribal court orders even when recognition is federally mandated).
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APPENDIX
STATE

TREATMENT OF TRIBAL CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS

TREATMENT OF GENERAL TRIBAL CIVIL
JUDGMENTS

ALABAMA

ALASKA

ARIZONA

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13.3601.01(b)
(2003) (stating that a person with a
tribal conviction for a domestic violence
offense who subsequently commits
another domestic violence offense
within sixty months may be placed on
probation and/or incarcerated),

ARKANSAS

ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12903(12)(A)(iii) (2003) (sex offender
registration law).

CALIFORNIA

ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.160 (Michie
2002) (ICWA mandate);170 John v.
Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 763 (Alaska 1999)
(Alaska courts should, as a general rule,
"respect tribal court decisions under the
comity doctrine"); Hernandez v.
Lambert, 951 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1998)
(ICWA case).
17B ARIZ. REV. STAT. TRIBAL CT. CIV. J.
RULES 1-7 (2000) (establishing full faith
and credit for tribal courts, unless
objection filed); 17B ARIZ. REV. STAT.
TRIBAL CT. INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT
ORDERS, RULES 1-6 (1994) (governing
the recognition of tribal commitment
orders); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-136
(2003) (making involuntary commitment
orders of Arizona tribal courts
enforceable in state court); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 13-3602 (2003) (VAWA
mandate);171 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 251004 (2001) (ICWA mandate); Brown v.
Babbitt Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d 689 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1977) (determining that
"Territory" under the federal Full Faith
and Credit Act does not include Indian
reservations, so Arizona state courts were
not required to give full faith and credit
to enactment of Navajo tribal council).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-302 (Michie
2003) (VAWA mandate); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-19-104 (Michie 1999) (ICWA
mandate).
People v. Super. Ct. Kern County, 274
Cal. Rptr. 586 (1990) (holding that the
Navajo nation is a "Territory" for
purposes of the Uniform Act to Secure
the Attendance of Witnesses from
Without the State in Criminal
Proceedings, so that California courts
must honor requests of Navajo Nation
courts for the appearance of witnesses at
criminal proceedings).

170. Statutes effectuating the federal Indian Child Welfare Act mandate will be referred to simply as "ICWA
mandate" throughout this chart.
171. Statutes effectuating the federal Violence Against Women Act mandate will be referred to as "VAWA
mandate."
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COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-2-127

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-2-126.5

(1999) (the state may suspend a driver's
license after repeated convictions for
traffic violations, including convictions
in Southern Ute tribal court),

(2001) (full faith and credit to a tribal
revocation of the reservation driving
privileges of an Indian; however, "tribe"
only means the Southern Ute tribe);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-803.8

(200 1) (VAWA mandate).
Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter. v.
DiMasi, 25 Conn. L. Rptr. 474 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1999) (holding a money
judgment of tribal court enforceable in

CONNECrICUT

state court as a matter of comity).
DELAWARE
FLORIDA
GEORGIA

GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12 (2003) (sex
offender registration law).

HAWAII

IDAHO

IDAHO CODE § 18-8303 (2003) (sex
offender registration law); State v.
Tesheep, 838 P.2d 888, 890 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1992) (considering prior tribal
court convictions as part of defendant's
character in order to determine whether
the district court abused its sentencing
discretion in a related offense).

IDAHO CODE § 7-1001 (2003) (defining
"state" as including tribes for purposes of
the Uniform Interstate Family Support
Act); Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d
895 (Idaho 1982) (full faith and credit to
tribal court adoption decree).

ILLINOIS

In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060 (I11.App.
1990) (holding that transfer of ICWA
case to tribal court was appropriate).

IOWA

IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2 (2003) (sex
offender registration law).

INDIANA

KANSAS

IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-17 (Michie
2000) (VAWA mandate).

KAN. CRiM. CODE ANN. § 21-4711
(West 2002) (out-of-state convictions,
including those of tribal courts, are used
in classifying an offender's criminal

KAN. STAT. § 21-3843 (2002) (VAWA
mandate).

history for sentencing purposes).
KENTUCKY
LOUISIANA
MAINE

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, §§

25 U.S.C. § 1725(g) (2001) (full faith

11203, 11222 (2003) (sex offender
registration law).

and credit between Passamaquoddy
Tribe, Penobscot Tribe, and the State of
Maine); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 5, §

MARYLAND

MASSACHUSETTS

4659 (2003) (VAWA mandate with
criminal enforcement provision).
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-508.1
(2001) (VAWA mandate).

MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROCEDURE §
11-701 (2003) (sex offender registration
law).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, § 178C
1 (2003) (sex offender registration law).

I
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MICHIGAN

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 257.625
and 257.65 (West 1997) (allowing the
use of prior D.U.I. convictions from
other states, and defining "state" as
including Indian tribes); People v.
Wemigwans, No. 239736, 2003 WL
734257, *3 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003)
(allowing the use of prior tribal court
drunk driving convictions for
sentencing purposes); Michigan State
Police Sex Offenders Act, MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 28.722, 28.723 (2003)
(sex offender registration).

[Vol. 34

MICH. CT. R. 2.615 (2003) (judgments
and orders of tribal courts granting
reciprocity to Michigan courts presumed
valid and given full faith and credit
unless objecting party proves one of
enumerated factors); MICH. CT. R.
2.112(g) (2003) (for the purpose of
pleading special matters, "[a] judgment
or decision of a...tribal court of a
federally recognized Indian tribe...must
be alleged with sufficient particularity to
identify it; it is not necessary to state
facts showing jurisdiction to render it");
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.2950h,

i (2002) (VAWA mandate).
MINNESOTA

MISSISSIPPI

In re Welfare of J.D.J., 2003 WL
21652325, 3 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003)
(considering juvenile's prior
involvement with tribal court, including
sanctions for disorderly conduct,
intoxication, and truancy, in
determining that the juvenile should be
treated as an adult).

MINN. CT. ORDER 018, GEN. PRAC. R. 10

(effective Jan. 1, 2004) (full faith and
credit for tribal court orders where
federally mandated; comity where
recognition of tribal court orders and
judgments is discretionary); MINN. STAT.
§ 260.771, subd. 4 (2003) (ICWA
mandate); Desjarlait v. Desjarlat, 379
N.W.2d 139, 145 (Minn. 1985)
("Principles of full faith and credit and
comity do not require state courts to
recognize a tribal custody order when the
tribal court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction and did not afford the parties
due process."); In re Custody of K.K.S.,
508 N.W.2d 813 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)
(in order to further the purposes of the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act and
the Child Custody Act, tribal court found
to have properly exercised jurisdiction
over child custody dispute involving
Indian child taken from the Red Lake
reservation,).
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act,
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-25-5 (1997)
("The chancery courts, circuit and county
courts, family courts and tribal courts are
the tribunals of this state."); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 97-3-107 (1997)(VAWA

mandate).
MISSOURI

MO. STAT. § 455.067 (2003) (VAWA
mandate).
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MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-734(1)
(2000) (a D.U.. conviction from a
federally recognized tribe may be used
to enhance a D.U.. sentence in state
court); State v. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d
1239, 1241 (Mont. 2003) (holding that
tribal D.U.I. convictions were properly
considered in District Court for the
purpose of enhancing state D.U.I.
conviction to a felony).

MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-9-503 (2000)
("A copy of any foreign judgment
authenticated in accordance with an act
of congress or the statutes of this state
may be filed in the office of the clerk of
any district court of this state. The clerk
shall treat the foreign judgment in the
same manner as a judgment of a district
court of this state.") (emphasis added);
Day v. State Dep't Social &
Rehabilitation Servs., Child Support
Enforcement Div., 900 P.2d 296 (Mont.
1995) (concluding that tribal child
support order and judgment are
enforceable by Child Support
Enforcement Division without initiating
a separate action in state court); Wippert
v. Blackfeet Tribe, 859 P.2d 420 (Mont.

1993) (comity for tribal court
iudements).
NEBRASKA

NEVADA

NEB. REV. STAT. 28-311.10 (2003)
(VAWA mandate).

NEV. REV. STAT. 179D.210 (2002) (sex
offender registration law).

NEV. REV. STAT. 33.090 (2003) (VAWA
mandate).

NEW HAMPSHIRE

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:13 (2002)
(VAWA mandate).

NEW JERSEY

Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter. v.

Malhorta, 740 A.2d 703 (N.J. 1999)
(tribal money judgment is enforceable in
state court).

NEW MEXICO

NEW YORK

N.M.S.A. 1978, § 66-8-102 (1999)
(providing increased penalties for
subsequent D.U.I.s; providing that a
fourth offense results in a felony;
specifying that tribal court D.U.I.
convictions are considered prior
offenses); N.M.S.A. 1978, § 66-527.1(b) (2003) ("The division is
authorized to suspend or revoke the
driver's license or driving privilege of a
person who has been convicted of a
motor vehicle offense by a tribal
court.").

N.M.S.A. 1978, § 40-13-6 (2003)
(VAWA mandate); N.M.S.A. 1978, §
32A-6-21 (2003) (ICWA mandate); Jim
v. CIT Financial Servs., 87 N.M. 362,
533 P.2d 751 (N.M. 1975) (holding that
the Navajo Nation is a "territory" for
purposes of the federal Full Faith and
Credit Act and therefore Navajo tribal
court judgment entitled to full faith and
credit); Halwood v. Cowboy Auto Sales,
Inc., 1997-NMCA-098, 946 P.2d 1088
(holding that a tribal court punitive
damage award was enforceable under
both principles of comity and full faith
and credit); Spear v. McDermott, 121
N.M. 609, 916 P.2d 228 (N.M. Ct. App.
1996) (affirming a fine imposed for the
disobedience of a Cherokee Nation court
child custody order).
N.Y. INDIAN LAW § 52 (McKinney 2003)

(providing since 1909 that decisions of
the peacemaker courts of the Seneca
Nation are enforceable in state court).
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N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50B-4(d) and 5OB4.1 (2003) (VAWA mandate); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § IE-l(a) (2003) ("The courts of
this State shall give full faith and credit
to a judgment, decree, or order signed by
a judicial officer of the Eastern Band of
Cherokee Indians and filed in the
Cherokee Tribal Court to the same extent
as is given a judgment, decree, or order
of another state...provided that the
judgments, decrees, and orders of the
courts of this State are given full faith
and credit by the Tribal Court of the
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians.").

NORTH CAROLINA

NORTH DAKOTA

N.D. CENT. CODE § 394)6-27 (2003)
('The director may suspend or revoke
the license of any resident of this state
or the privilege of a nonresident to drive
a motor vehicle in this state upon
receiving notice of the conviction of that
person in a tribal court or in another
state of an offense therein which, if
committed in this state, would be
grounds for the suspension or
revocation of the license of an
operator.").

OHIO

2003 OHIo LAWS 45 (sex offender

N.D. STAT. § 27-01-09 (2003) ("The
district courts shall recognize and cause
to be enforced any judgment, decree, or
order of the tribal court of the Three
Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Reservation in any case [subject to
certain requirements, including
reciprocity] involving the dissolution of
marriage, the distribution of property
upon divorce, child custody, adoption, an
adult abuse protection order, or an
adjudication of the delinquency,
dependency, or neglect of Indian children
if the tribal court had jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the judgment,
decree, or order."); N.D. R. CT. 7.2
(2003) (specifying that the orders and
judgments of tribal courts in North
Dakota are to be treated like those of
foreign nations); Fredericks v. EideKirschmann Ford, Mercury, Lincoln,
Inc., 462 N.W. 2d 164 (N.D. 1990)
(tribal court judgment enforceable in
state court as matter of comity).

registration law).

OKLAHOMA

57 OKLA. STAT. ANN. 582 (2003) (sex
offender registration law).

OKLA. DIST. CT. RULE 30(b) (adopted
1994) (granting full faith and credit
where tribal courts grant reciprocate); 12
OKLA. ST. ANN. § 728 (2003)
(authorizing standards for the recognition
of records and proceedings of tribal
courts); 43 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 551-104
(2003) (ICWA/child custody); Barrett v.
Barrett, 878 P.2d 1051 (Okla. 1994)
(holding that tribal court divorce was
entitled to full faith and credit, but that
wife was entitled to present evidence of
invalidity of tribal proceeding).

SYMMETRY
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OR. LEGIS. 73 (2003) (amending OR.
REV. ST. § 25.075) (Department of

OREGON

Human Services may enter into
cooperative agreements with tribes
regarding child support matters, provided
certain conditions are met); Marriage of
Red Fox, 542 P.2d 918 (Or. Ct. App.
1975) (tribal court divorce decree entitled
to recognition in state court).
PENNSYLVANIA
RHODE ISLAND
SOUTH CAROLINA

SOUTH DAKOTA

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-1-25 (Michie

2003) ("No order or judgment of a tribal
court in the state of South Dakota may be
recognized as a matter of comity in the
state courts of South Dakota, except
under [certain] terms and conditions"
established by clear and convincing
evidence."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2510-12.1 (Michie 2003) (VAWA
mandate); Red Fox v. Hettich, 494
N.W.2d 638, 643, 647 (S.D. 1993)
(holding that tribal member didn't satisfy
burden of proof necessary to show that
tribal court had jurisdiction so that its
judgment should be recognized under
principle of comity outlined in S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 1-1-25; clarifying the
method of jurisdiction analysis for the
recognition of tribal court judgments);
Gesinger v. Gesinger, 531 N.W.2d 17
(S.D. 1995) (holding that tribal court
judgment was entitled to comity, even
though judgment was still on appeal):

TENNESSEE

Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §

36-6-207 (2003) (child custody); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-3-622 (2003) (VAWA
i__mandate).
TEXAS

___

UTAH
VERMONT

VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 5401 (2003)

(sex offender registration law).
VIRGINIA

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1101 (2003)
(VAWA mandate).
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-253.2, 16.1-

279.1, 18.2-119, 18.2-308.1:4, 19.2152.10 (Michie 2002) (VAWA mandate
with criminal enforcement provisions).
WASHINGTON

WEST VIRGINIA

Wheeler v. State Dep't of Licensing,
936 P.2d 17, 18 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997)
(traffic convictions by a tribal court can
be included in the 20 convictions that
give rise to suspension of a driver's
license under the habitual traffic
offender statute).

WASH. R. SUPER. CT. CIV. C.R. 82.5(c)
(1995) (full faith and credit to tribal court
orders, judgments, and decrees as long as
there is reciprocity, due process, and
jurisdiction); In re Adoption of Buehl,
555 P.2d 1334 (Wash. 1976) (holding
that tribal court custody order was
entitled to full faith and credit).
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WISCONSIN

WIS. STAT. § 343.307 (2003)
(convictions of a tribal court in the state
of Wisconsin shall be counted by a state
court in determining the proper penalty
for subsequent D.U.I. offenses); see also
State v. Schuman, 520 N.W.2d 107
(Wis. Ct. App. 1994); WIS. STAT. §
343.31 (2003) (providing for revocation
of driving privilege after certain
offenses, including conviction "under a
law of a federally recognized American
Indian tribe or band in this state which
is in conformity with state law"); In re
Elmer J.K., M, 591 N.W.2d 176 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1999) (considering tribal
record in deciding to prosecute juvenile
as adult).

WIS. STAT. § 806.245 (2003)
(proclaiming full faith and credit for
tribal courts, but setting forth a list of
requirements that look more like
comity); WIS. STAT. § 69.035 (requiring
the state registrar to accept the vital
records of tribal courts); WIS. STAT. §
344.25 (2003) (requiring the secretary to
suspend the driving privileges of an
individual who has not satisfied a
damage judgment of a tribal court within
30 days of notice from the secretary).
Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake
Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 665
N.W. 2d 899, 902 (Wis. 2003) (requiring
full faith and credit for tribal court
iudgment).

WYOMING

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-5-233 (2002)
(providing for enhanced sentences for
subsequent D.U.I. convictions and
considering tribal convictions as prior
offenses).

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-111 (2002)
(granting full faith and credit to the
judicial records, orders and judgments of
the courts of the Eastern Shoshone and
Northern Arapaho Tribes of the Wind
River Reservation, unless one of
enumerated requirements is not met);
Income Withholding Act, WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 20-6-202 (2002) (including tribal
court child and spousal support orders in
the definition of "support order").

